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FOREWORD
China and Russia have two of the world’s most
powerful militaries, and their growing defense cooperation has long been a subject of interest to the
United States. Studying their military exercises provides insights for several questions of critical importance for the U.S. Army: What are the evolving power-projection capabilities of the Chinese and Russian
armed forces? How have their tactics, techniques, and
procedures evolved over time? How do the Chinese
and Russian militaries conduct joint operations, from
planning to execution? What is their level of operational interoperability—physical and otherwise? How
might they conduct a future counterterrorist or counterinsurgency campaign in Central Asia, or maintain
regional security in the region following the withdrawal of most North Atlantic Treaty Organization
combat forces from Afghanistan?
This monograph helps us to answer these questions, as well as consider the broader nature of the
trilateral relationship between China, Russia, and the
United States.
		

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
China and Russia have engaged in an increasing
number of joint exercises in recent years. These drills
aim to help the two countries deter, and if necessary
defeat, potential threats—such as Islamist terrorists
trying to destabilize Central Asian governments—
while also reassuring their allies that China and Russia will protect them from such threats. Furthermore,
the recurring exercises, and other joint Russia-China
military activities, have a mutual reassurance function insofar as they inform Moscow and Beijing about
the other’s military potential and thereby build mutual confidence. Finally, the joint exercises attempt to
communicate the message to third parties, especially
the United States, that China and Russia have a genuine security partnership that extends to cover Central
Asia (a region of great importance for Moscow and
Beijing) and possibly other areas such as Northeast
Asia. Although still limited in key aspects, the SinoRussian defense relationship deserves to be monitored
by the United States as potentially one of the most
significant international security developments of
recent years.
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PARSING CHINESE-RUSSIAN
MILITARY EXERCISES
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the
Russian Federation continue to develop their defense
partnership to encompass a wide range of activities,
including arms sales and joint military exercises.
Their governments share important security concerns
and do not perceive each other as near-term military
threats. Russia has been unable to develop a robust relationship with Western countries or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collectively, leaving
the PRC as its most important defense partner outside
the former Soviet Union. In recent years, China has
become more eager to pursue defense diplomacy with
the United States and other countries, but Russia remains its primary foreign arms supplier and military
exercise partner.
BACKGROUND
From its origins as primarily a Russia-to-China
arms transfer in the 1990s, the security relationship between China and Russia has evolved into something
more closely resembling a balanced, though limited,
defense partnership between two unallied but nonadversarial countries. During the Cold War, Chinese and
Soviet armed forces stared each other down across
the world’s longest border. They even engaged in a
small-scale shooting war in the late-1960s over contested islands lying along a shared river. During the
1990s, the two defense establishments largely ignored
each other. The Russian high command was seeking
to recover from the collapse of the integrated military
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structures of the Soviet armed forces and the Moscowled Warsaw Pact. It was also striving to manage the
conflicts that had arisen along Russia’s periphery following the messy disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, Russian commanders were trying to suppress an unexpectedly vicious and robust insurgency
in Chechnya. In China, the military was seeking to
come to terms with its June 1989 crackdown on mass
anti-regime protests centered in Tiananmen Square.
The brutality of the repression led Western governments to sever defense ties with Beijing and impose
arms embargoes and other sanctions. In this context,
Chinese-Russian defense relations consisted mostly of
haggling over how much the PRC would pay to purchase Russia’s excess holdings of Soviet-era weapons.
Though by no means a traditional defense alliance,
the Sino-Russian military relationship has become a
more balanced (though limited) security partnership
between two countries that are neither adversaries
nor allies, but share certain security concerns such as
avoiding direct military conflicts, managing security
along their border and nearby regions like Central
Asia, maintaining Eurasian stability, and balancing
the United States and its allies. Neither perceives the
other as a near-term military threat; indeed, many
Russian and Chinese leaders view reconciliation after
decades of wars and armed confrontations as a major
achievement and strive to maintain cordial ties, even
as they recognize the possibility of renewed tensions
in coming years. Although China has become more
open to engaging in defense diplomacy with the United States and other countries, Russia remains Beijing’s
defense exercise partner of choice and main foreign
arms supplier. Meanwhile, Russia has been unable
to develop robust defense relationships with NATO
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or other potential partners outside of some of the former Soviet Republics, which leaves China as its most
important defense partner outside of Eastern Europe.
While Russian and Chinese officials, including their
presidents, have advocated strengthening the defense
partnership further, both governments credibly deny
any intent to establish a genuine mutual defense alliance such as the United States has with Japan, South
Korea, and its NATO allies.
Over time, this bilateral defense relationship has
become more institutionalized and better integrated.
As befits the governments of two large and powerful
neighbors, the senior military leaders of China and
Russia now meet frequently in various formats. Since
1997, they have held yearly “strategic consultations”
between their deputy chiefs of the general staff, and
their direct encounters now include annual meetings
of their defense ministers and their armed chiefs of
staff, with other Chinese and Russian foreign, defense,
and internal security officials often joining these bilateral summits.1 All of these national security officials
also interact frequently at various multilateral gatherings, especially within the framework of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO, Eurasia’s
most important regional security institution, is comprised of China and Russia, along with four of the five
Central Asian countries (excluding only Turkmenistan). In March 2008, the Chinese and Russian defense
ministers established a direct telephone line—the first
such ministerial hotline ever created between China
and another country.2 In December 2008, the chiefs of
the Chinese and Russian general staffs created their
own similar such link.3 Contacts between mid-level
military officers are even more common, especially between commanders of border security units and units
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in neighboring Chinese and Russian territories. Russian and Chinese military experts also engage in regular direct discussions related to their functional expertise in such areas as communications, engineering, and
mapping.4 Academic exchanges also occur frequently;
more than 1,000 Chinese students have studied at over
20 Russian military academies since 1996.5 The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, signed
in 2001, does not include a mutual defense clause,
but does stipulate both nonaggression and mutual
consultations clauses.
Since 2003, the SCO members have organized a
number of “anti-terrorist exercises” involving their
armed forces and law enforcement personnel. On October 10-11, 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted
Exercise-01, which was the first bilateral anti-terror exercise within the SCO framework. Hundreds of their
troops participated in joint border operations in this
drill, which Xinhua says represented “the first time for
PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to hold a joint military maneuver with a foreign army (sic).”6 (Like the organization’s other projects, most SCO exercises, even
those described as occurring within the SCO, typically
involve only two or three member countries.) This was
the case in August 2010, when the law enforcement
and internal security forces of Russia, Kazakhstan,
and Kyrgyzstan spent a week participating in what
the Russian authorities called an “international operational and strategic exercise of SCO member states”
against a hypothesized terrorist threat.7 However,
some SCO exercises do involve additional members.
From August 6-12, 2003, some 1,300 troops from five
SCO countries joined Coalition-2003, a series of antiterrorism exercises held in the border city of Ucharal
in eastern Kazakhstan and in Ili, located in China’s
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Xinjiang region. Out of the SCO members, only Uzbekistan failed to participate. The operation marked
“the first time China participated in multilateral joint
military maneuver.”8 Three years later, Uzbekistan,
having broken with the West in 2005 and oriented towards Moscow, not only participated in, but hosted
the SCO multilateral exercise, East-Anti-terror-2006.
In this drill, representatives from the member governments’ special forces and law enforcement personnel
rehearsed defending public facilities from terrorists.9
MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES
In addition to humanitarian relief, military exchanges, and numerous small-scale border drills,
China and Russia have conducted a major bilateral or
multilateral joint exercise on an almost yearly basis.
The bilateral war games are unprecedented in the history of relations between Beijing and Moscow.
Peace Mission 2005.
The first of these Peace Mission exercises occurred
from August 18-25, 2005. The Chinese and Russian
militaries conducted a three-phased operation that
began in Russia's far eastern city of Vladivostok and
then moved to China’s Shandong Peninsula, where
the participants conducted land and then amphibious
maneuvers.10 Whereas the PLA supplied most of the
troops (8,000 versus 2,000), the Russians provided the
most sophisticated equipment, such as Russian Tu-160
and Tu-95 strategic bombers, as well as some 140 warships.11 The maneuvers practiced during Peace Mission 2005 included neutralizing anti-aircraft defenses,
enforcing a maritime blockade, and conducting an am-
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phibious assault and other joint naval operations. One
Russian analyst described the exercise as rehearsing
“a conventional all-out assault using the Russian and
Chinese tactics developed in the 1970s and 1980s.”12
Not even during the 1950s—when China belonged
to the Soviet bloc and had a formal mutual defense
treaty with Moscow—did the two countries carry out
such a large joint exercise. Although their stated purpose was to fight terrorists and restore peace among
hypothetical local combatants, the large scale of the
air, sea, and ground drills made it appear to both Russian and foreign observers like a rehearsal for a joint
amphibious invasion of Taiwan, with tactics designed
to deter or defeat U.S. military intervention on the island’s behalf.13 The U.S. Defense Department (DoD)
also interpreted the exercise as an attempt by China,
at least in part, to strengthen its power projection capabilities with respect to Taiwan.14 The Russian government, at least, did not seek to impart such an impression. Moscow had reportedly rejected an earlier
PRC proposal to conduct the exercise in Zhejiang, a
Chinese coastal province near Taiwan.15
Another possible scenario could have been a joint
Chinese-Russian military occupation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), undertaken if
the regime in Pyongyang were to collapse. In addition
to the risk of a massive flight of DPRK refugees fleeing into neighboring Chinese and Russian territory,
Beijing and Moscow might worry that South Korean
and U.S. military forces might move into North Korea
to avert the humanitarian disaster; secure the DPRK’s
nuclear explosive devices and other weapons of mass
destruction before they could fall into the hands of terrorists, criminals, or other rogue regimes; and further
the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. goal of reunifying
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the Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s leadership. Beijing and Moscow might therefore want to occupy the
territory first to prevent U.S. forces from moving close
to their borders.16
Peace Mission 2007.
Peace Mission 2007 began on August 9 in Urumqi,
the capital of China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous
Area, and ended on August 17, with a live-fire exercise at the Russian military training range near Chelyabinsk, in Russia’s Volga-Urals Military District.
Unlike Peace Mission 2005, this exercise, which did
not involve military ships, was better oriented toward suppressing a major Islamist insurgency (such
as occurred in Chechnya) or popular rebellion (such
as occurred at Tiananmen Square in 1989 or Andijan
in 2005), presumably in one of the landlocked Central
Asian countries. Perhaps due to the fears prevailing at
the time that the SCO was trying to drive NATO out
of Central Asia, several scholars have already written
detailed studies of this exercise.17
Unlike in Peace Mission 2005, the armed forces of
all six full SCO members participated in the 2007 war
games, contributing a combined 7,000 troops, 1,270
weapons systems, and 86 combat aircraft. Russia provided 2,000 personnel, 122 millimeter (mm) and 100mm artillery systems, and 40 aircraft. China supplied
1,300 soldiers, 40 Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) and
14 bronyetransportyer (BTR) armored infantry vehicles,
18 pieces of 122-mm and 100-mm artillery systems,
340 air force personnel, and 46 aircraft. Except for the
PLA, all the countries used Russian-made ammunition, arms, and equipment. Even during the exercise,
the Chinese forces would engage in solo military actions and displayed a higher level of secrecy.18
7

The declared purpose of the war games was to
show the determination of the SCO member states to
combat the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and
extremism.19 Lieutenant General Vladimir Moltenskoy, deputy commander of Russia’s Ground Forces,
said that the exercise could also be used as training
and educational material for SCO militaries for antiterrorism operations.20 Other goals enunciated by the
participants included ensuring regional security, stability, and prosperity.21 Observers ascribed additional
motives to the participating governments. According
to Roger N. McDermott, Chinese military analysts
used this exercise to assess their “strategic insertion
capabilities, cooperative operational capabilities, ability to carry out precision operations and long-range
integrated support capabilities”; and some Chinese
military officers believed that this exercise could help
to reform and modernize the PLA.22 Russia used the
opportunity to put forward anti-Western views. For
example, Russian Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy
claimed that promoting Western-style democracy in
Central Asia would contribute to regional instability.23
Putin exploited the occasion to announce the resumption of long-distance patrol flights by Russian strategic
nuclear bombers, which had been suspended in 1992
with the end of the Cold War.
Peace Mission 2009.
Unlike in 2007, only Chinese and Russian troops
participated in Peace Mission 2009, which took place
from July 22-27 of that year. Chinese and Russian representatives sought to place the exercise within the
SCO framework, but the only concrete involvement
of that organization came from its secretariat and the
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four other SCO members—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—that sent observers to the
drill.24 In this respect, the 2009 exercise more closely
resembled Peace Mission 2005, which formally occurred under the rubric of their bilateral friendship
treaty, than Peace Mission 2007, which involved combat troops from other SCO members. Peace Mission
2009 differed from the previous two exercises in the
series in other respects. For example, the operational
phase took place only on Chinese territory, with a
single day of staff discussions in Russia looking like
a simple attempt to involve some Russian territory in
the drill. In addition, the number of troops participating was considerably lower than in previous years,
though both Chinese and Russian forces deployed
surface-to-air missiles (somewhat out of place in a
nominal anti-terrorist drill) for the first time in one of
their joint exercises.25
Peace Mission 2009 began with a day of politicalmilitary consultations among senior Chinese and Russian defense personnel in Khabarovsk, the largest city
in the Russian Far East and the headquarters of the
Far East Military Command.26 The opening ceremony
also took place there, with dozens of senior officials
in attendance, including Chen Bingde, the Chief of
the PLA General Staff, and Nikolai Makarov, his Russian counterpart.27 The officials reportedly discussed
“the overall anti-terror situation” and “the terrorism
trends in member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” as well as Afghanistan.28 The
operational phases of the exercise occurred at the Taonan training base in China’s Shenyang Military Area
Command, which borders the Russian Far East. Both
parties established a theater-level command headquarters there. They then spent 3 days jointly plan-
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ning and organizing for a combined anti-terrorist
campaign. The most important exercise segment was
the 90-minute live-fire drill held on the last day at the
base.29 All told, about 1,300 military personnel from
each country participated in some phase of Peace Mission 2009. The Russian air force contributed about 20
military aircraft to the maneuvers in China, including
Su-25 and Su-27 combat jets, Il-76 transport planes,
Su-24 bombers, and Mi-8 helicopters.30 The Russians
had considered sending strategic bombers to the exercise, but ultimately declined, following the practice of
2007 rather than 2005.31 The Russian ground forces involved included BMP-1 and BTR-70 armored vehicles,
as well as T-80 tanks.32 A Russian airborne assault unit
also practiced parachuting from Il-76s.33 The Chinese
armed forces contributed combat aircraft, artillery, air
defense, army aviation, and special forces contingents
as well as logistical support to both sides.34
This Chinese-Russian drill differed from the previous two Peace Mission exercises in certain respects.
First, the operational phase occurred only on Chinese territory, with the single day of discussions at
Khabarovsk looking like an attempt to involve Russian territory in some capacity. Second, the troop
numbers were considerably lower. Several factors
might explain the smaller size of Peace Mission 2009.
Lieutenant General Sergei Antonov, the first deputy
chief of staff of the Russian ground forces, argued that
the two armed forces wanted the drills to correspond
to their actual experience fighting small groups of
mobile terrorists.35 Russian analysts interpreted this
as applying lessons learned by Russian forces in the
northern Caucasus and the Chinese military in Xinjiang.36 Other reasons for the smaller scale might have
included operational considerations (the shorter time
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for preparation and the more genuine focus on countering terrorism), the costs constraints on the two governments due to the global economic recession, their
desire not to alarm foreign observers, and China’s declining purchases of Russian weapons systems, which
reduced Moscow’s incentive to use the drill as a sales
opportunity.
In any case, both countries conducted much larger
national exercises around this time. Russia’s Kavkaz
2009, which ran from June 29 to July 6, involved
more than 8,500 military personnel, as well as more
tanks, fighters, helicopters, and warships than had
ever participated in a bilateral exercise with China.37
A month following Peace Mission 2009, China conducted Stride 2009, a 2-month-long PLA exercise involving some 50,000 military personnel—including
divisions from the Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, and
Guangzhou regional military commands—at the
same base that Peace Mission 2009 occurred. At the
time, the August-September Stride-2009 drill represented the largest tactical training exercise ever
conducted by the PLA.38
Peace Mission 2010.
From September 9-25, 2010, the SCO rehearsed
joint operations against a terrorist group in an urban
setting as part of Peace Mission 2010, which took place
in southern Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl region. This exercise more closely resembled the multinational Peace
Mission 2007 than the 2005 and 2009 war games,
which were exclusively Sino-Russian drills, though
other SCO members received invitations to send observers to the latter exercises. However, Peace Mission 2010 ran 1 week longer than Peace Mission 2007.
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With 5,000 troops and considerable advanced military
equipment, Peace Mission 2010 remains the largest
SCO military exercise ever held outside of Russian
and Chinese territory. The 2010 exercise occurred
against a backdrop of continuing ethnic-religious minority unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet, newly resurgent
terrorist activity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the
Russian-controlled territories of the North Caucasus.
Hundreds of people died the previous year in vicious
street fighting between Uighurs and Han Chinese in
Xinjiang and other parts of China. The PLA authorities, who used the military to suppress the disorders
after the police and other internal security forces lost
control of the situation, blamed the ethnic rioting on
foreign-backed terrorists seeking to create a separate
state of East Turkmenistan.
The exercise consisted of three phases. The first
stage involved consultations among senior political
officials and military officers in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
The defense ministers, general staff chiefs, and others
involved discussed how to employ SCO troops to resolve emergencies as well as the global and regional
security environment, defense cooperation within the
SCO, and other shared interests among the member
states. The Chiefs of the General Staffs then issued
instructions to start the drills.39 The next two phases
involved combat exercises among the forces that had
deployed to the Matybulak Air Base near Gvardeisky
in Kazakhstan. Stage two, which began on September
13, focused on joint maneuvers and drills in which
the SCO contingents practiced making preparatory
fire, mobilizing reserves, besieging residential areas,
conducting breakouts, and using suppressing fire at
night. During the main hour-long drill on Septem-
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ber 15, the forces employed more than 1,000 armed
vehicles, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and other
ground equipment, as well as more than 50 military
aircraft.40 Phase 3, which started on September 24, saw
some live-fire drills, and then ended with a display
of combat equipment from the member states.41 Peace
Mission 2010 also involved more demanding live-fire
drills than previous SCO exercises. In those cases, the
simulated combat operations often appeared as media
shows, timed to coincide with the annual SCO headsof-state summits. In 2010, the live drills occurred
over several days, and about 50 percent took place
at night.42
Peace Mission 2010 included some 5,000 troops,
300 major combat pieces such as tanks, sophisticated
defense equipment for engineering and communications, and more than 50 combat planes and helicopters.43 Russia, China, and Kazakhstan each sent at least
1,000 troops to the war games, whereas Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan contributed smaller numbers, though
even these represented at least one self-standing operational-tactical group.44 Russia sent the largest amount
of military equipment—some 130 tanks, self-propelled
artillery systems, and infantry fighting vehicles, as
well as over 100 trucks and about a dozen aircraft
from its nearby base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, including
Su-24 Fencer tactical bombers, Su-25 Frogfoot closesupport aircraft, and Mi-8 transport helicopters.45 In
the end, Uzbekistan, which traditionally has been
uneasy about Russia’s military presence in Central
Asia, declined to send troops. At the time, Uzbek officials had been leading the effort to resist expanding
the SCO’s military functions. They had criticized SCO
exercises for resembling a Soviet-era military drill that
did not meet the contemporary security needs of the
organization’s Central Asian members.46
13

The PLA sent a major contingent that consisted of
a ground force of approximately 1,000 soldiers, an air
force combat group, and a logistics group under the
command of Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the PLA
General Staff.47 The Chinese contingent included some
of the PLA’s most sophisticated indigenous weapons
systems, including T-99 tanks, H-6 strategic bombers,
J-10 fighters, as well as aerial tanker and early warning aircraft.48 The H-6 and the J-10 warplanes were
participating in their first foreign exercise.49 Western
observers noted that, uniquely among the participating militaries, the Chinese forces possessed and employed sophisticated “network-centric capabilities”
that allowed them to display impressive combined
armed tasks.50 In Peace Mission 2010, the PLA demonstrated improved logistics, command and control,
and more sophisticated weapons and tactics. Before
the exercise began, the PLA forces undertook extensive pre-deployment theoretical, basic, and combined
combat training, optimized for joint counterterrorist
training.51 In early September, hundreds of PLA soldiers traveled by train from a PLA training military
base at Zhurihe, located in North China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, to Matybulak air base in
Kazakhstan. The total distance covered during the
week-long trip was 5,000 kilometers (km), after which
the PLA soldiers immediately began preparing for
their drills.52 One Chinese writer boasted that this represented “a big test for PLA’s comprehensive transportation capability.”53 According to Li Zhujun, deputy chief of the Chinese military’s exterior liaison for
the exercises, the PLA moved a total of six contingents
of almost 1,000 troops, 1,000 tons of materials, and additional quantities of military equipment. PLA logisticians also had the opportunity of loading and unload-
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ing carriages as they passed from the 2.98-meter gauge
used in China to the 2.87-meter gauge employed in
Kazakhstan. “By improving the quality of service and
logistics in various links,” Li declared, “we have created conditions for the soldiers and officers to devote
themselves to the exercises in high spirits and full of
vitality.”54 In addition, the Chinese Army’s helicopters rehearsed their first nighttime shooting exercise
at the war games.55 Perhaps the most interesting skill
demonstrated by the PLA was how the air force conducted its first simulated long-range air strike. Four
H-6 bombers and two J-10 fighter jets took off from
air bases in Urumqi, China. They then divided into
two groups that, following mid-air refueling, each rehearsed bombing ground targets in Kazakhstan, 2,000
km away from their departure base. According to the
PLA, these planes could have conducted their bombing runs even without refueling.56 Having the capacity
to conduct long-range air strikes and coordinate airground battle maneuvers could prove useful for attacking insurgents in Central Asia as well as combating Indian ground forces. A PRC analyst claimed that
the H-6 bombers hit their target every time, and that
the helicopters were able to fly only 40 meters above
the ground in a valley.57 A Western analyst termed the
strikes a “milestone” in the PLA’s ability to intervene
rapidly in Central Asia.58
Naval Interaction 2012.
From April 22-27, 2012, China and Russia held their
first official bilateral naval exercise (variously referred
to as Naval Interaction 2012, or Maritime Cooperation
2012) around China’s Yellow Sea port of Qingdao, the
base of the PLA Navy’s Northern Fleet. Peace Mission
2005 featured a much larger maritime component,
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but the 2012 maneuvers were bilateral exercises held
outside the SCO. On this occasion, the combined fleet
simulated the rescue of a hijacked ship, escorting commercial vessels in pirate-infested waters, joint air defense, maritime search and rescue, and anti-submarine
tactics.59 The aircraft and special forces in Naval Interaction 2012 did conduct a joint maritime anti-terror
task.60 Nevertheless, the two governments declined
to characterize the war games as formally having a
primarily anti-terrorist purpose. Instead, they referenced a more diverse set of goals such as improving
interoperability, sharing techniques, rehearsing skills,
and enhancing regional stability. These are the same
declared purposes of many of the multinational naval
exercises conducted in the Asia-Pacific region by the
United States and other countries.
Both China and Russia made major contributions
to Naval Interaction 2010. Although the Chinese supplied more ships than their partner, some of the Russian
vessels were very advanced. The Chinese and Russian
navies shared important command, control, and communications functions during the drills, which helped
them practice their combat interoperability and the
effectiveness of their control, electronics, and information systems.61 The PLA Navy (PLAN) contributed
4,000 service members, 16 ships (five missile destroyers, five missile frigates, four missile boats, a support
vessel, and a hospital ship), two submarines, and 13
aircraft (along with five shipboard helicopters).62 The
PLAN Type 052 Luhu-class multirole destroyer Harbin (a domestically-produced, second-generation ship
that is the Northern Fleet’s flagship) acted as the command vessel—responsible for directing both sides’
ships, submarines, and fighters.63 The rest of the Chinese contingent consisted of four guided missile de-
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stroyers—including the Shenyang (Type 051C Luzhouclass), the Fuzhou (of the Russian Sovremenny-class),
and the Taizhou (an improved Project 956EM Sovremenny)—the guided missile frigates Luoyang and Mianyang (both Type 053H3 Jiangwei-II-class), and the
Type 054A Jiangkai-II-class frigates Yiyang, Zhaoshan,
and Xuzhao; the Fuqing-class fleet oiler Hongzhu was
tasked with replenishment duties.64 The Chinese fleet
also included four missile boats, two submarines (at
least one of which was a Type 039G1 Song-class), and
a hospital ship.65 Meanwhile, Russia deployed four
combat ships and three supply vessels from its Pacific
Fleet, which is headquartered in Vladivostok: the Slava-class cruiser Varyag, the flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, was present, along with three Udaloy-class
anti-submarine destroyers (the Admiral Vinogradov,
Marshal Shaposhnikov, and Admiral Tributs—the last of
the three being from the Northern Fleet), the tugboat
MB-37, the fleet tanker Pechenga, and the supply ship,
SB-22.66 Throughout the live-fire drills, ship-to-ship
communications were conducted in Russian.67 This
was also not the first time that the Varyag had taken
part in one of these joint naval exercises; in April 2009,
the 11,500-ton Varyag had led the formation of foreign
ships on review at the celebrations marking the 60th
anniversary of the PLAN’s founding.68
Naval Interaction 2012 involved two phases. The
first phase consisted of preparation of headquarters
and naval units and the deployment of ships.69 The
Russian ships arrived at Qingdao on April 21, and the
exercises themselves began the next day.70 The two
sides also practiced relaying information between
Chinese and Russian naval command stations and
the joint headquarters of the exercises.71 The second
“active” phase included live-fire exercises and ship
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maneuvers. (The naval component of Peace Mission
2005 included these two phases but also had a third
phase consisting of amphibious operations.72) Starting on April 25, the active phase of the exercises began, with sailors engaging in tactical drills with small
arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) aimed
at defending their ships from posited hijackers. The
PLAN and Russian ships then practiced fending off
simulated air attacks, resupplying at sea, and moving
into an area containing enemy submarines.73 On the
morning of April 26, the two sides engaged in a joint
counterhijacking and naval escort drill using 13 naval
vessels, four helicopters, and two special operations
teams. Five of the warships conducted a naval escort
for four merchant ships, which, minutes later, were
attacked by four designated pirate boats. The naval
escorts and their shipboard helicopters rapidly drove
the pirates away. The two sides then simulated a raid
on a hijacked Chinese merchant ship, with 20 Chinese and Russian special force operators successfully
boarding the ship and rescuing the hostages. Both
sides also conducted live-fire exercises that involved
shelling ships some 30 km away, as well as joint antiaircraft and anti-submarine drills. The anti-submarine
exercise employed a sonar target that was used to test
submarine detection capabilities, as well as rocketpropelled depth charges. The drill was conducted
with the Admiral Tributs’ shipboard Ka-27 helicopters
searching for the sonar target, and then reporting
their coordinates to the anti-submarine ships, which
deployed countermeasures.74 Following these livefire drills, a fleet review was held later that day (still
April 26), marking the end of the active phase of the
exercise.75 The exercises officially ended on April 27
with a closing ceremony.76
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Peace Mission 2012.
From June 8-14, Peace Mission 2012 was held at the
Chorukh-Dayron training range in northern Tajikistan’s Sughd Province. More than 2,000 soldiers and
500 vehicles from SCO members China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan participated.77 The
host government said that the drills simulated fighting terrorists operating in Central Asia’s mountainous
terrain.78 The exercise included “military maneuvers,
including air and ground strikes, encirclement, and
suppression, as well as pursuit and vertical interception.”79 China contributed 369 army soldiers. The PLA
ground troops travelled by vehicle via Kazakhstan
from Xinjiang, while the PLA army aviation flew over
Kyrgyzstan after departing from Kashi Airport.80 Russia used some troops already in the region that were
supporting the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO): a reinforced motorized rifle
company from one of the battalions at its 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, which forced marched to the
exercise site through mountainous terrain, and some
attack planes stationed at the CSTO base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.81 Kazakhstan sent an air assault battalion and
air defense forces as well as armored personnel carriers, combat helicopters, and fixed-wing warplanes;
Kyrgyzstan dispatched a mountain warfare company
and a special forces unit; and host Tajikistan contributed a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with
tanks, an air assault unit, military transport helicopters, and emergency response units.82 The Uzbekistani
government sent only some observers while denying
the government of Kazakhstan’s request to allow its
troops to traverse Uzbekistan’s territory to reach Ta-
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jikistan, with which Uzbekistan has poor relations;
the Kazakhstan units ended up having to go through
Kyrgyzstan to reach northern Tajikistan.83 With only
some 350 soldiers coming from China and from Russia, this combined figure of 700 military personnel
represented the smallest number of forces ever participating in a Peace Mission exercise from these two
great military powers. A description of the counterterrorism drill itself also suggests a relatively limited operation: soldiers battled terrorists at a roadblock and
at a residence where they held hostages. They were
supported by armored vehicles, helicopters, and a few
combat aircraft.84
Naval Interaction 2013.
From July 5-13, China and Russia conducted an
8-day naval drill in the Sea of Japan. These war games
(which the Russians termed Naval Interaction 2013
and the Chinese Joint Sea-2013), were larger and more
sophisticated than the first exclusively Sino-Russian
naval exercise held the previous year. During the livefire drills, which ran from July 8 to July 10, the Chinese and Russian ships simulated escorting commercial vessels, rescuing a hijacked ship, and defending
a convoy of ships from sea and air attacks.85 The 2013
exercise was comprised of 18 surface vessels, including four guided-missile destroyers, two missile frigates, and a supply vessel, as well as a submarine and
three helicopters. The drills involved a total of 4,000
military personnel, including special forces units from
both countries. China sent fewer ships than in 2012—a
total of seven vessels, which included four guidedmissile destroyers, two guided-missile frigates, and
a supply ship, as well as three shipborne helicopters
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and a special operations detachment.86 Nevertheless,
these vessels, which came from the PLAN’s North
Sea and South Sea fleets, included some of the PLA
Navy’s most advanced warships such as a guidedmissile destroyer that had an Aegis-type radar and an
anti-submarine warfare missile frigate.87
Peace Mission 2013.
Two weeks later, Peace Mission 2013 took place
from July 27 to August 15 at the Chebarkul military
range in Russia’s Chelyabinsk Region in the Urals.
Some 600 Chinese troops and 900 Russian troops participated, but no other SCO country sent troops in
this exclusively Sino-Russian exercise.88 This exercise
marked the first occasion when both countries’ regional military area commands, rather than their national military headquarters, planned a joint exercise
together.89 In this case, the United Strategic Command
of the Russian Central Military District, led by the
deputy chief of staff of the District, Major-General
Sergey Chuvakin, and the PLA’s Shenyang Military
Region, led by its deputy chief of staff, Zhang Yan,
organized the drills with a joint command of 60 Chinese and Russian staff officers. Both sides no longer
followed their former tradition of depending solely
on their respective national command systems and executing the planned flow of events with little bilateral
interactions. Instead, they now worked side by side
with each other, coordinating activities in a real-time
manner, thereby transforming their previous parallel
planning into a joint planning process. The two regional commands also contributed the troops to the
exercise, as well as more than 250 pieces of military
hardware.90 PLA spokesperson Geng Yansheng said
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that the Chinese contributions to the joint drill included a planning cell, a command element, and infantry,
air force, and logistics groups. Their weapons systems
included armored vehicles, self-propelled guns, and
fixed- and rotating-wing aircraft, including Z-9 and
M-171 helicopters.91 The Russian media related that:
Chinese troops brought along their own tanks, light
reconnaissance vehicles, 120-mm self-propelled howitzers, 152-mm self-propelled guns, JH-7A ‘Flying
leopard’ fighter-bombers and Harbin Z-9 gunships
and Mi-171 transport helicopters.92

Peace Mission 2013 simulated a campaign-level
operation with more than 25,000 soldiers (rather a
large size for a mere “counterterrorism” exercise).
As only 1,500 soldiers were physically present, the
remaining personnel were “virtual soldiers,” which
worked fine for the deployment and planning phases,
which involved computer simulations as well as joint
staff meetings.93 According to the Chinese Ministry
of Defense, the three components of the war games
were “troop deployment, battle planning, and simulated combat.”94 Getting to the Chebarkul military
range was a challenge for the PLA units departing
from Shenyang. Since the training range was more
than 4,000 km away, they required a week of travel,
and the exercises stipulated that this had to occur under simulated combat conditions.95 The ground forces
could travel by rail, but the helicopters had to land
eight times and be escorted through Russian air space
by Russian Mi-8 combat helicopters.96 In the live-fire
drills on August 15, Chinese and Russian elite troops
operated in mixed ground formations consisting of
tanks, artillery, and special forces; for the first time,
the Chinese and Russian special forces used the same
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helicopters in the simulated combat phase, which in
this case lasted only an hour.97 Russian and Chinese
planes and helicopters formed a united air group to
provide support for the ground operations.98 These
units coordinated operations, shared intelligence, operated helicopters, and gave orders bilingually. Colonel General Nikolai Bordanovskiy, chief commander
of Russia’s Central Military District, explained that,
“Although they speak different languages, the two
militaries have worked out a set of rules to facilitate communication by using gestures with military
signals.”99
Naval Interaction 2014.
Russians called the maritime drills Naval Interaction 2014, whereas the Chinese referred to the exercise as Joint Sea-2014.100 Sources offer varying dates
when the maneuvers formally began and ended, with
the earliest start date being May 20 and the latest end
date being May 26.101 The location of the exercise was
vaguely described as taking place in the “northern waters and aerial space of the East China Sea.”102 Before
sailing there, the Russian ships participating in Naval
Interaction 2014 engaged in joint maneuvers with the
PLA at Usun naval base in Shanghai.103 The two commands finalized the subsequent drills there, and then
their fleets departed together for the exercise’s staging grounds in the East China Sea.104 On May 19, 2014,
Chinese and Russian sailors toured each other’s ships
in port.
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On this occasion, the joint maritime exercise coincided with a state visit of Russian President Vladimir
Putin to China, which lasted May 20-21. Putin and
PRC President Xi Jinping were both in the city attending the summit of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA), an emerging
Eurasian security institution that China had begun
chairing in May 2014.105 Both presidents attended the
exercise’s official opening and praised Naval Interaction 2014 for enhancing mutual cooperation and security. Putin argued that, “the military ties are an important part of the Russia-China comprehensive strategic
partnership of coordination.” He “called for enhanced
cooperation to tackle various threats and challenges to
safeguard regional and world peace and stability.”106
Xi said that the exercises “would showcase the two
sides’ resolve in responding to threats and challenges
as well as safeguarding regional security and stability.” Xi further stated that the 2014 drills “display the
new level of strategic mutual trust and coordination
between the two countries.”107
During the second day of Putin’s visit, China and
Russia announced the signing of a major gas deal.
There was also media speculation of further Russian
arms sales to China: to include advanced air and missile defense systems such as the S-400, the Lada class
air-independent propulsion submarines, and Su-35
multirole fighter jets—all assets that would enhance
China’s ability to project power over disputed maritime territories.108 These developments confirmed for
many the impression of a further strengthening of the
China-Russia partnership since the Ukrainian crisis
led to a sharp downturn in Russia’s relations with
the West.
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According to Russian and Chinese sources, Naval
Interaction 2014 consisted of 12 ships109 (six Chinese,
six Russian); two submarines (both Chinese); nine
fixed-wing aircraft (seven Chinese, two Russian); six
helicopters (two to four each); and two marine commando units (one Chinese, one Russian).110 Interestingly, until just a few days before the exercise began, 14 ships were originally reported as planning to
participate.111 The reductions in the number of ships
involved, along with the confusion over when the
drills started, suggest the exercise underwent some
last-minute changes. The six Russian ships came from
Russia’s Pacific Fleet; it was led by the guided-missile
cruiser Varyag, capable of carrying 16 advanced SS-N12 anti-ship missiles armed with nuclear warheads in
a configuration designed primarily to destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.112 The Russian contingent also included
the fleet destroyer Bystry, the submarine warfare ship
Admiral Panteleyev, the amphibious warship Admiral
Nevelskoy, and two service vessels, the tanker Ilim and
the tug boat Kalar.113
Overall, the Russian Order of Battle consisted
of the following ships: Slava Class Guided Missile
Cruiser Varyag, Sovremenny Class Destroyer Bystry,
Udaloy Class Anti-Submarine Destroyer Admiral Panteleyev, Large Landing Ship Project 775 Admiral Nevelskoy, Tanker Ilim, and Tugboat Kalar.114
Host-country China made a somewhat larger contribution to the drills. The participating PLAN vessels
included the latest-generation Russian-built destroyer
Ningbo and the Chinese-built Type-052C Luyang II destroyer.115 The Zhengzhou is one of the most advanced
combat vessels in the PLA’s East Sea Fleet. It can carry
48 HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, based on
the Russian-built S-300, to intercept enemy aircraft, as

25

well as C-805 and YJ-62 missiles, capable of attacking
enemy ships and land targets. China’s Su-30 fighters
and JH-7 bombers provided air support for both fleets.
In addition, J-10 fighters took part in the Russia-China
exercises for the first time.116
The Chinese Order of Battle consisted of the following ships: Type 052 Guided-Missile Destroyer Harbin,
Type 052C Guided-Missile Destroyer Zhengzhou, Type
956 Destroyer Ningbo, Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Yantai, Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Liuzhou,
Type 903 Replenishment Ship Qiandaohu, Type 022
Houbei-class missile boats, attack submarines Kamov
Ka-28; and/or Harbin Z-9 helicopters, and seven warplanes of multiple classes.
Although China and Russia each contributed six
major ships to Naval Interaction 2014, the overall Russian contingent was smaller this time and played more
of a support role. Russia provided only three of the
eight surface combatants and none of the submarines,
but did supply two of the exercise’s three support
ships. Furthermore, only two of the nine fixed-wing
aircraft were Russian. The larger contribution of the
PLA Navy was most likely due to the exercises taking place off China’s coast. When China and Russia
conducted their first joint naval exercises in 2012, the
drills took place off China’s coast, and PLA Navy ships
predominated. When the 2013 exercises took place
near Vladivostok, the Russian Navy contribution was
larger than that of China. It would thus appear that
whichever country is hosting the exercises provides
the bulk of their participants. If anything, Russia’s
contribution in 2014 was somewhat robust, compared
to the last time the PRC hosted the exercises in 2012,
when the Chinese contingent was considerably larger
than the Russian one.
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The 2014 exercises consisted of a wide range of missions, including jointly identifying potentially hostile
aircraft, combating submarines, providing joint air
defense, escorting vessels, engaging in search-andrescue missions, recapturing a seized ship, and intercepting missiles.117 For example, Chinese and Russian
ships conducted a drill to fight underwater “frogmen,” and stop terrorists on speedboats. In addition,
they rehearsed defending ships at anchorage by providing early warning against possible enemy attacks,
evacuating the warships under attack, and countering
the attack with kinetic actions and through electronic
systems.118 On May 24, 2014, the militaries conducted
joint anti-submarine exercises. Both navies used live
weapons in the drill, with eight ships firing main guns,
high-speed guns, and rocket depth charges.119
Some of these missions appear geared towards anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations of the type that
the Chinese and Russian navies have been engaged in
for years, primarily in the Gulf of Aden—though the
two fleets do not cooperate closely with each other or
the other navies on patrol there. Chinese researchers
note that protecting sea lanes is important for China,
which relies heavily on maritime trade.120 Their May 23
anti-piracy drill occurred under the command of the
Varyag, which ordered special forces to eliminate “pirates” on a “hijacked” ship.121 The simulated defense
of ships at anchorage is a skill that is needed to counter pirate attacks, though the Chinese may also have
wanted to remind observers that Imperial Japan had
also conducted such attacks.122 Naval Interaction 2014
also saw much simulated ship-to-ship combat. The
Chinese and Russian fleets split into two teams that
simulated combat against one another (as they have
in previous years), but they also formed three mixed
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groups, commanded by both Russian and Chinese officers in both languages, that engaged one another.123
Wang Chao, head of a PLAN coordinating team, said
that the mixed grouping would enhance naval coordination between the two countries.124 Furthermore, by
assuming responsibility for providing air cover to both
fleets during the drills, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
gained experience in controlling airspace through coordination of fighter and surface vessels.125 According
to Li Jie, an expert at the PLA’s Naval Military Studies
Research Institute, “the exercises operate more like a
real battle.”126
Peace Mission 2014.
From August 24-29, the SCO held its largest multinational exercise in history, Peace Mission 2014. The
drills took place at Zhurihe Training Base, located in
Inner Mongolia in North China. Zhurihe has become
China’s main base for engaging in large-scale exercises with foreign armies on its soil.127 Five of the six SCO
members sent troops (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, but not Uzbekistan). The war
games saw a panoply of weapons in use, including
unmanned aerial vehicles, air-defense missiles, tanks,
armored vehicles, other ground vehicles, and special
operations units. A total of about 70 aircraft flew roles
in the exercise, including fighter planes, airborne early
warning aircraft, armed helicopters, and surveillance
and combat drones.128 The combined forces practiced
ground and aerial reconnaissance, joint precision
strikes, integrated air-ground assaults on fortified
positions, joint hostage rescue and urban assault missions, and extensive information sharing.129 According
to Liu Zhenli, Commander of China’s 38th Army:
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The level of collaboration this time is much higher
than in previous joint military exercises. We have
established a joint commanding center, and another
affiliated commanding center for five armies and air
forces. An information sharing mechanism has also
been set up among five parties for reconnaissance.
Joint actions have also been carried out, especially in
terms of hostage rescue.130

The exercise scenario involved an international
terrorist organization supporting a separatist movement in a country, plotting coups, and aiming for
violent regime change. More specifically, the scenario hypothesized that a city in an unnamed Eurasian
country (implicitly a SCO member) had become a hub
of political instability and terrorist activity, and its
government called on the SCO to intervene to resolve
the issues.131 The fictitious separatist organization has
more than 2,000 fighters armed with tanks, missiles,
and even light aircraft—something on the scale of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) rather than
al-Qaeda.132 The exercise’s three phases included troop
deployments, battle planning, and simulated combat.
Before the live drills, the multinational forces moved
to the Zhurihe base, conducted some planning meetings, and held an opening ceremony in which the deputy chiefs of the general staff from China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and deputy commander
of Russia’s Eastern military command participated.133
The first stage of the third live-fire phase involved the
SCO forces using electronic warfare measures against
their adversary’s communication systems. Chinese
and Russian planes, helicopters, and drones then conducted air strikes against the “terrorists.” The SCO
forces subsequently employed high-precision artil-
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lery attacks that destroyed the terrorists’ command
centers. Finally, SCO ground forces with combined
air support liberated the terrorist-occupied zones and
freed their hostages.134
China provided the most troops by far. In addition
to some 5,000 personnel and more than 400 combat
systems from the 38th Combined Corps and the air
force under the PLA’s Beijing Military Area Command (MAC), China assigned some forces directly
under the PLA general headquarters/departments,
including aerospace reconnaissance, mapping, hydrometeorological, and mobile logistics support detachments providing “strategic and operational support.”135 The PLAAF CH-4 unmanned combat aerial
vehicle (UCAV) made its first appearance at an SCO
exercise. The CH-4 (Cai Hong 4 or Rainbow 4), which
resembles the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, shot
several targets during the live-fire drills.136 One PLA
official said that the drones’ ability to monitor, identify, and destroy ground targets in real time made it
an important counterterrorist tool.137 PRC authorities
claim that Uighur insurgents fighting Beijing’s rule in
Xinjiang’s vast northwestern region have used illicit
border crossings and desert encampments that can
be monitored by air.138 Chinese aerospace firms have
developed dozens of drones, and the PLA is eager to
take advantage of these unmanned systems. The Chinese also contributed some of their most sophisticated
manned aircraft such as its J-10 and J-11 fighter jets, its
JH-7 fighter bombers, and its KJ-2000 airborne early
warning and control aircraft.139 Also debuting in the
SCO exercises were the WZ-10 and WZ-19 attack helicopters used by the PLAAF and the Ground Force.
The larger Z-10, Fierce Thunderbolt, is designed primarily for anti-tank missions, but has some air-to-air
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capability; the smaller Z-19 Black Whirlwind is an
upgraded version of the Z-9 attack helicopter, which
is also manufactured by the Harbin Aircraft Industry
Group.140 During the war games, the helicopters practiced reconnaissance and rocket barrages.141 Meanwhile, three IL-76 transport aircraft from an aviation
regiment of the Guangzhou MAC air-dropped people
and equipment during the drills.142 The PLA Army’s
most modern Main Battle Tank, the Type 99—a variant of the former Soviet T-72—also took part in the
exercises.143
Almost 1,000 Russian troops participated in Peace
Mission 2014, travelling by rail from Russia’s Eastern
Military District.144 The main units assigned to the
drills were the 36th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade and an aviation group from the 3rd Air Force and
Air Defense Command.145 Russia also contributed 60
armored vehicles (including 40 BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles and 13 T-72 main battle tanks); more than
20 missile and artillery systems (including the SAU
2S3M self-propelled guns and BM-21multiple-launch
rocket systems); more than 60 other military vehicles;
eight Mi-8 AMTSh helicopter gunships; four Sukhoi
Su-25 attack planes; and two IL-76 military transport
planes.146 The Russian media reported that the artillery
systems used Krasnopol semi-automatic laser-guided
explosive projectiles during their drills.147 Unlike in
Peace Mission 2013, the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan each sent hundreds of elite soldiers: Kyrgyzstan deployed about 500
members of its special forces units, along with a few
dozen combat vehicles (including eight tanks); 148 Kazakhstan, which often sends the largest Central Asian
contingent, provided only about 300 elite airborne
troops.149 Finally, some 200 rapid reaction troops came
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from Tajikistan.150 As usual, Uzbekistan, though a SCO
member, again did not send troops to participate in
the exercises.151 The observers at the exercise included
representatives from the SCO Secretariat, the SCO regional anti-terrorism organizations, the five SCO observer states, the three dialogue partners, and military
attachés from more than 60 countries.152
The day before the exercise ended, President Xi met
with the SCO chiefs of staff, who were then meeting in
Beijing, and praised the drills for “having made positive contributions to regional security and stability.”153
In addition to China’s large troop contribution, Wang
Ning, chief director of the Joint Directing Department
of the exercise and deputy chief of the PLA general
staff, boasted at the start of the war games that the
SCO “exercise will be conducted in China throughout
the process for the first time” and, also for the first
time, would occur simultaneously with a meeting of
the chiefs of the SCO members’ general staffs and with
a military music festival.154
ASSESSMENT
These joint Russian-Chinese military exercises
serve several important national security purposes for
both governments. One of their original aims was to
facilitate Russian weapons sales to China. Russia has
used the drills as an opportunity to showcase to the
Chinese defense community certain weapons systems
that they want to sell to the PLA. The Chinese presumably welcome the chance to examine the capabilities of
Russian systems through these exercises. Peace Mission 2005 in particular could be seen, in part, as an
elaborate staging ground for demonstrating Russian
military technologies to potential Chinese buyers. At
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the time, China, along with India, was the leading buyer of Russian weapons. During the exercises, Russia
showed off the Tu-95 strategic bombers and Tu-22M
long-range bombers that Moscow was then trying to
sell to Beijing. Although these strategic bombers are
older platforms (the Tu-160 is Russia’s most advanced
strategic bomber), they can launch long-range cruise
missiles against air and ground targets, including U.S.
aircraft carriers.155 The sales motive was also evident in
the Russian decision to leave the bombers that participated in the exercise, as well as other types of military
aircraft, on display in China for several days following
the maneuvers. The policy of exploiting the opportunity to highlight a few advanced weapons systems to
the Chinese during the exercise may have worked. A
few weeks after the drills, China placed a large order
for one of the participating warplanes, the Il-78 tanker.156 In recent years, this function has declined in importance, since the Chinese armed forces, benefiting
from growing indigenous capabilities of the Chinese
defense industry, have been buying fewer Russian
weapons. However, the resumption in recent years of
large-scale Chinese purchasing of Russian arms might
revive the use of this exhibit function. China may also
start using these exercises for this purpose, especially
if the SCO expands in size. Beijing has until now declined to sell weapons to Russia’s Central Asian allies
out of deference to Moscow, but has practiced no such
constraint regarding Pakistan, Iran, or Turkey.
A more enduring goal of the exercises is to improve the operational and tactical proficiency of both
militaries and increase their interoperability. Chinese
defense representatives have traditionally cited the
advantage of using exercises with foreign countries
as opportunities to learn new tactics, techniques, and
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procedures. For example, the 2007 live-fire drills in
Chelyabinsk allowed the PLA to practice deploying
and supporting a large military force at a considerable distance from mainland China.157 The same challenge was overcome with Peace Mission 2013, when
the PLA forces had to travel more than 4,000 km from
the PLA’s Shenyang Military Region to the Chebarkul
training field in the Urals. At the time, deputy chief
of staff for the Shenyang region Shi Xiangyuan told
the media that “exercises like Peace Mission 2013 are
called with an eye to helping both armies to strive as
close to perfection as possible.”158 The PRC can use the
maneuvers with Russia to practice coordinating large
and varied forces with one of the world’s leading
military powers. At the time of Peace Mission 2013,
Wang Haiyun, vice president of the Chinese Society
for the Study of the History of Sino-Russian Relations,
explained that, “Holding joint drills will enable China
and Russia to learn from each other, deepen mutual
trust and boost each other’s combat power.”159
China seeks the same goals in the maritime domain. Yin Zhuo, an adviser to the PLAN, said the
Chinese Navy was eager to interact with the more
modern Russian Navy, telling Chinese TV that, “Both
sides will have deep exchanges in terms of tactics and
technology.”160 For example, the Russian and Chinese warships that participated in Naval Interaction
2012 simulated rescuing a hijacked vessel, protecting
commercial ships from pirates, anti-submarine warfare, and joint maritime air defense and search and
rescue.161 Then Naval Interaction 2013 practiced a
wider range of skills, including at-sea replenishment,
anti-piracy convoying, surface warfare, and fleet air
defense.162 Zhang Junshe, deputy director of the Naval Military Studies Research Institute, acknowledged
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that the PLAN had achieved significant technological
advances in recent years, but he argued that Russia’s
military technology was still more advanced.163 At
the time of the 2014 naval exercises, the PRC Defense
Ministry described their purpose as, “to deepen practical cooperation between the [Chinese and Russian]
militaries, [and] to raise the[ir] ability to jointly deal
with maritime security threats.”164 PRC experts also
state that joint defenses can allow navies to cooperate more efficiently in coping with maritime security
threats than if they acted unilaterally.165 As for Peace
Mission 2014, these land exercises rehearsed combating international terrorist organizations supporting a
separatist movement and boosting intelligence sharing in response to such events.166 In recent years, the
PLA has developed a cadre of Russian-speaking officers to coordinate with the Russian and other SCO
militaries, thereby promoting interoperability.167
The Russian armed forces also aim to improve their
performance through these exercises. The movement
of Russian troops and equipment to China in preparation for Peace Mission 2009 represented the largest
foreign deployment by the forces of Russia’s Far Eastern Military District since Soviet forces invaded northeastern China to attack the Japanese occupation troops
at the end of World War II.168 Furthermore, whereas
previous Sino-Russian exercises focused on suppressing terrorists, guerrillas, and possibly rebellious cities
or provinces, the latest naval drills explicitly have as
one of their goals the enhancing of their ability to cooperate against maritime piracy. The two navies have
been operating together (though mostly in parallel)
in the Gulf of Aden, fighting Somali-based pirates,
and some experts said they wanted to improve their
interoperability in such operations.
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The Russian and Chinese forces involved in these
war games have demonstrated increased proficiency
over time, though it is unclear whether this improvement results from the exercises themselves or the
strengthening capabilities of both sides’ conventional
forces in recent years due to other initiatives. The 2005
series saw only a limited degree of operational interoperability. That year’s drills involved mostly parallel
Chinese and Russian military maneuvers in the same
area of operations.169 The subsequent exercise rounds
have demonstrated greater integration, though it is
still dubious if both militaries could conduct a joint
battle, with integrated tactical operations, rather than
a joint campaign in which they operated independently in parallel sectors (e.g., with Russian troops
moving into Kyrgyzstan from the north while Chinese
forces enter from the east). Their ability to organize
a rapid joint military response even in a neighboring
state is also questionable. The Chinese media cited a
PLA general who boasted that, after deciding to hold
Peace Mission 2009, they spent “only 6 months” getting ready for the drill to better “demonstrate Chinese
forces’ quick [sic] response capabilities.”170 The SCO
lacks the integrated command and control mechanism
to organize a more rapid collective military intervention, even in one of its member countries. Perhaps for
this reason, the Russian government has been trying
to develop a rapid response force within the Moscowcontrolled CSTO that Russia and its allies can employ
for urgent scenarios.
These exercises could enhance the ability of the
Russian, Chinese, and perhaps other SCO armed
forces to deter—and if necessary suppress—another
popular rebellion or large–scale terrorist movement,
such as the ones that occurred in Tiananmen Square in
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spring 1989 and Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005.171
At the time, the 2007 drills in Xinjiang led some observers to speculate that exercise aimed “to intimidate
the Uighur population in East Turkestan and to warn
the democratic forces in Central Asia not to challenge
the authoritarian regimes.”172 The 2009 maneuvers
between the Russian and Chinese militaries occurred
against the backdrop of mass unrest in Xinjiang and a
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the
Russian-controlled territories of the North Caucasus.
Hundreds of people had died the previous month in
vicious street fighting between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang and other parts of China. The authorities, who used the military to suppress the disorders
after the police and other internal security forces lost
control of the situation, blamed the ethnic rioting on
foreign-backed terrorists seeking to create a separate
state of East Turkmenistan. During the weeks preceding the exercises, the governments in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan reported that Taliban-linked
insurgents were infiltrating their countries from Afghanistan.173 Wang Xinjun, researcher with the PLA
Academy of Military Sciences, wrote at the time of
Peace Mission 2013 that, “The foreign media tend
to focus on military cooperation between China and
Russia in the context of geopolitical strategy, while ignoring the fact that the two countries face a common
threat from terrorism.” He added that Peace Mission
2013 communicated to the world that:
China and Russia will work together to firmly crack
down on terrorism, which causes significant harm to
a world that is trying to achieve peace and development. The resurgence of terrorist forces in China and
Russia in recent years demonstrates the need for cooperation between the two countries.174
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The Chinese representatives especially emphasized the counterterrorist dimensions of the 2009
exercise. A series of PLA military experts called the
drills a “warning” meant to deter terrorists.175 Major
General Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché to
Russia, observed that, “To some extent, the July 5 Xinjiang riot pushed forward anti-terrorism cooperation
between China and Russia.”176 According to General
Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA,
“China and Russia have a very clear objective to jointly eliminate terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”
Chen added: “We fight for peace.”177 In describing the
tactics involved, Chinese Major General Luo Yuan, a
researcher with the PLA’s Military Sciences Academy,
stressed that, “The major subjects of the exercise are
not designed to train positional attack-and-defense or
mobile warfare, but to encircle and suppress unprepared terrorists.”178 At the opening ceremony, General
Makarov also emphasized the counterterrorist purpose of the drills, arguing that the Urumqi riots “show
that more and more terrorist, separatist, and extremist
forces are emerging, and, recently, to that we have to
add pirates” that were operating off Somalia and attacking foreign vessels defended by Russian, Chinese,
and other international warships. “I believe the joint
task of our two armed forces is to fight such illegal
forces,” Makarov insisted.179 Despite the lack of a clear
counter-terrorist purpose for the surface-to-air missiles, the rest of the order of battle for Peace Mission
2009 seems well-suited for fighting terrorist groups
such as the Taliban and Chechen insurgents.
In contrast, the massive 2014 war games saw tanks,
warplanes, and precision missions being used against
a terrorist group that had thousands of fighters as
well as its own light aircraft and ground equipment.
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In justifying the exercises, Chinese writers pointed to
the growing threat that terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and other countries could spillover into Central Asia
and argued that “joint military drills and other moves
taken by SCO members for defense and security cooperation will send a strong deterrent signal to the ‘three
forces’ of terrorism, extremism, and separatism in the
region.”180 The exercise occurred after Chinese authorities had become alarmed by the surge in Uighur
domestic terrorism during the past year in China’s
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. PRC Defense
ministry representatives declared that the exercise
would help deter the “three evil forces” of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism by strengthening the militaries’ ability to coordinate counter-terrorism operations.181 Fang Fenghui, Chief of the PLA General Staff,
said that, “The success of the joint drill demonstrated . . .
their resolution to fight against the three evil
forces. . . .”182 He maintained that the situation around
Afghanistan was becoming more complicated and
“terrorists are rapidly infiltrating into Central Asia.”183
Even if they do not establish a military presence in Afghanistan, which became a formal SCO observer in
2012, China and Russia might work with their Central Asian partners to establish some kind of barrier
to try to limit the flow of Afghan-based terrorists and
narcotraffickers into their countries. China is aiming
to construct a New Silk Road through Central Asia as
well as deepen transportation links with Pakistan and
Iran, while Russia is trying to establish an integrated
economic and security bloc among the former Soviet
states, some of which border Afghanistan.
Another goal is to underscore the high level of defense cooperation between China and Russia. The exercises are not explicitly intended for the classic pur-
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pose of collective defense. The bilateral Sino-Russian
friendship treaty, signed in July 2001, lacks a mutual
defense clause, instead obliging both sides to refrain
from aggressive acts toward one another and to consult in the case of mutual threats and international
crises. Furthermore, Chinese government representatives have stated repeatedly for years that they will not
join foreign military alliances. At the May 2014 CICA
summit in Shanghai, President Xi, while joining Putin
at the concurrent China-Russia naval drills, attacked
the concept of Cold War alliances that exist at “the
expense of others . . . and leave the rest insecure.”184
Nonetheless, the combined maneuvers do affirm the
two countries’ commitment to defense cooperation
as one dimension of their evolving relationship. Major General Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché
to Russia, observed that, “Military cooperation is the
highest level and most sensitive exchange between
two countries and China and Russia’s joint military
drill has demonstrated the solid bond between the
neighbors.”185 Major General Qian Lihua, director of
the Ministry of National Defense’s Foreign Affairs
Office, specifically described Peace Mission 2009 as
contributing to the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Beijing and Moscow:
This drill is a specific move to consolidate and deepen
the two nations’ strategic cooperation partnerships,
an important practice to implement the consensus
reached at the [June 2009] SCO summit and a key
program for celebrating the two nations’ diplomatic
relations.186

Nikolai Markov, the chief of the Russian General
Staff, said that “Russia sees great importance in pro40

moting cooperation between the two militaries and
the naval exercise shows that bilateral strategic coordination is at a high level.”187 According to Viktor
Litovkin, the chief editor of the Independent Military
Review, the exercises help “confirm” to both sides as
well as external audiences “that Russia and China are
committed to military cooperation in the region.”188
Collaborating through joint exercises could also be
seen as a form of mutual confidence building aimed
at reassurance and mutual trust. Since the end of their
Cold-War antagonisms, Russia and China have adopted a series of arms control measures along their joint
border, including advanced notification of large military exercises in the vicinity. The Russia-China border
demilitarization talks began in November 1989. They
soon split into parallel negotiations: one on reducing
military forces along the Russian-Chinese frontier, the
other on establishing confidence and security building measures in the border region. The other newly
independent former Soviet republics bordering China—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—also
participated in demilitarization and confidencebuilding measures involving China. In July 1994, the
Russian and Chinese defense ministers agreed to a set
of procedures to avert future incidents, including arrangements to prevent unauthorized ballistic missile
launches, prevent the jamming of communications
equipment, and warn ships and aircraft that might
inadvertently violate national borders. In September
1994, Chinese and Russian authorities pledged not
to target strategic nuclear missiles at each other. On
April 26, 1996, the governments of China and the four
former Soviet republics signed a Treaty on Deepening
Military Trust in Border Regions, which established
a set of military confidence-building measures along
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their shared borders. At their second meeting, which
occurred in Moscow on April 25, 1997, the “Shanghai
Five,” as these countries were known before they added Uzbekistan and created the SCO, signed a Treaty
on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border
Regions. This accord has restricted conventional military deployments and activities within a 100 km-wide
demilitarized zone along their shared frontiers. The
Shanghai Five also established a Joint Control Group,
which still holds sessions, to monitor implementation of these confidence-building measures.189 In April
1998, China and Russia established a direct presidential hot line—China’s first with another government.
Some of these agreements are largely symbolic in that
they are not accompanied by any verification or enforcement procedures. For example, either country
can rapidly retarget its strategic missiles. Leaders can
choose to use the hot line, or not pick up the receiver.
Yet, most of the accords are self-enforcing. China and
the former Soviet republics were eager to demilitarize
following the end of the Cold War.
Chinese authors commonly refer to the value of
these exercises for promoting, or at least confirming,
a high level of mutual trust among the participants.
Wang Ning sees them having an “important and
far-reaching political significance on strengthening
mutual trust among the SCO member states.”190 The
Russian-Chinese exercises, whether they occur bilaterally or occur within the multilateral SCO framework, help supplement the formal arms control agreements by providing additional information regarding
the tactics, techniques, and procedures practiced by
the other military as well as its capabilities and intentions. Recurring exercises and other forms of cooperation also increase both states’ confidence that the
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other will stand with them, or at least stand aside, if
they enter into a conflict with another party. Chen
Bingde, Chief of the PLA General Staff, said that the
exercises promote “strategic coordination and mutual
trust” between the Chinese and Russian military establishments.191 Luo Yuan, a researcher with the PLA
Academy of Military Sciences, also said that the:
Joint drills have become the regular means of military
cooperation between China and Russia, helping to improve both armies’ structures, mutual trust, and military transparency.192

Ren Yuanzhe, a researcher at China Foreign Affairs University, said that the two navies “took concrete steps to increase military transparency through
the exercise.”193 Li Shuyin, a research fellow with the
Academy of Military Sciences, called the 2014 naval
exercise “a clear show of enhanced mutual trust between the two militaries, and of increased transparency.” Noting that the Sino-Russian maritime drills
had occurred 3 years in a row, Li said that they had
become a “routine and institutionalized cooperation
mechanism between the two sides.”194 According to
Chinese sources, during these exercises, tactics, technical performances, and data were shared between
the two navies, and each showed its respective tactical concepts and weapons employment practices.195
The Chinese and Russian fleets also allowed the other
country’s sailors to board their ships, both during
combat and when they were docked in port before the
exercise.196 Perhaps most importantly, not only did
the two navies simulate combat against one another, but they also split into mixed groups under joint
command. Although NATO and other navies have
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engaged in joint drills with their alliance partners,
Naval Interaction 2014 marked the first time that the
PLAN has engaged in this kind of joint drill with a
foreign country.197
Shi Xiangyuan, deputy chief of staff of the PLA
Shenyang Military Region, which organized China’s
participation in Peace Mission 2013, told the Russian
ITAR-TASS news agency that, “We’re not competitors,
but we’re partners. Trust between the two countries
became the unique feature of the Peace Mission.”198
Commenting on the most recent Peace Mission 2014,
Meng Xiangqing of the PLA National Defense University argued that China had displayed a high level of
trust in allowing the other SCO members to send their
armed forces into its interior.199 A deputy commander
of Russia’s Eastern military command described these
countries military ties as “unbreakable,” emphasizing
Russia’s commitment to its role in the SCO.200 Shao
Yuqun, at the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies, argued that the SCO exercises “can help build
up mutual trust between the member states and thus
enable the SCO to play a greater role in stabilizing the
region” including by nonmilitary means.201
In this regard, the two militaries are presumably
also interested in learning more about the evolving
capabilities of a possible future adversary (e.g., each
other). Alexander Khramchikhin, the Director of Russia’s Institute for Political and Military Analysis, argues that the joint military operations provide an occasion for both militaries to check each other: “China
intends to study Russia’s strong and weak points
during the drills in case Russia becomes its adversary
in the future.”202 Unlike during the Cold War, China
and Russia no longer fear engaging in a shooting war.
The two countries have largely accepted their com-
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mon border, which at almost 2,700 miles (consisting
of a small segment in China’s northwest and a much
larger frontier along China’s northeast) is one of the
longest borders between two neighboring countries in
the world. Yet, Russians worry about the long-term
implications of China’s exploding population for
Russia’s demographically and economically stagnant
eastern regions. In addition, militaries like to develop
contingency plans for a range of possible scenarios.
Furthermore, the exercises provide an opportunity
for China and Russia to demonstrate their capabilities to external audiences. The Chinese and Russian
denials that they intended to send messages to others
with their joint exercises appear pro forma. Using military exercises to communicate signals to third parties
is a common objective of these drills. These activities
typically attract greater attention than simple political declarations or other routine civilian government
activities. For example, Director Wang Ning described
Peace Mission 2014 as “pushing forward establishment of a fair and reasonable new international political order.”203 Demonstrating military prowess is a
time-honored tactic for reassuring friends and deterring adversaries. Through such operations, the Russian armed forces can counter doubts that they have
not yet fully recovered from their post-Soviet meltdown, while the Chinese can show off their growing
sophistication of their own military.
One target audience might be Central Asia.
Through their exercises, which typically involve observers if not always combat troops from Central
Asian states, China and Russia underscore their ability to defend Central Asian governments from foreign
or internal threats. Eurasia’s precarious regional security situation, combined with the SCO’s failure to in-
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tervene in Kyrgyzstan to suppress the June 2010 riots,
alarmed many Central Asians about whether they can
confidently rely on the SCO to protect them against
external and domestic security threats. By reassuring
Central Asian governments that they can depend on
Beijing and Moscow, the drills also weaken Western
influence in the region by helping persuade their SCO
allies that they need not rely on NATO and the United
States for their defense.204 Russia in particular has benefited from highlighting its commitment to combating threats to regional stability to justify its military
presence in Central Asia. Unlike the United States
and other NATO countries, Russia has not experienced problems obtaining military bases on the territory of its SCO allies. Central Asian governments also
generally appear to prefer working within the SCO,
which is not dominated by a single country. China’s
balancing presence presumably reduces fears of external subordination and gives them more room to maneuver. For example, with low-key Chinese support,
Uzbek officials have been leading the effort to resist
expanding the SCO’s military functions. Conversely,
it is easier for the Central Asian governments to deal
with the Chinese colossus through the SCO rather
than directly. In terms of political signaling to third
parties, moreover, the maneuvers affirm to the United
States and other extra-regional countries that Russia
and China consider Central Asia as lying within their
overlapping zones of security responsibility. Chief of
Russia’s general staff General Nikolai Makarov said at
the opening ceremony of the Peace Mission 2009 exercises that they “must show the international community that Russia and China have the necessary resources
to ensure stability and security in the region.”205
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The Chinese and Russian governments and media
regularly affirm that their military exercises are not
aimed at any third party. For example, trying to reassure Westerners that they need not worry about the
recent holding of back-to-back ground and maritime
Sino-Russian exercises, one Chinese commentator
wrote that:
The simulated enemies of the joint forces in the Joint
Sea 2013 and Peace Mission 2013 drills are obvious:
pirates and terrorists. So people who allege that China
and Russia are targeting a third country or that they
are trying to establish a ‘military alliance’ are only
betraying their Cold War mentality.206

One year later, both countries dismissed notions
that Peace Mission 2014 represents a joint Sino-Russian response to the recent Western sanctions on Russia and U.S. pressure on China. In July 2014, Chief of
Russian presidential staff Sergei Ivanov insisted that
Russia and China would not “create a new military
alliance, union or something like that,” and that SinoRussia co-operation “was not targeted at anyone.”207
In August 2014, The People’s Daily published a commentary by Zhang Junshe, a researcher at the China
Naval Research Institute, which read:
Some Western media have described this drill as ‘a
Central Asian grouping that is dominated by China
and Russia, aiming to challenge U.S. influence in Asia
as well as the international order ruled by U.S. and its
European allies’. Any reasonable analysis of this drill
will expose the fact that these doubts and criticisms
stand on shaky foundations.208

Junshe further stated that the drills’ dates and
plans were determined well before the Ukraine crisis,
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that the exercise focused on helping members deal
with “the threat of increasingly severe territorial attacks,” that the exercises were very transparent to outside observers, and insisted that the tasks had nothing to do with capturing “disputed islands.”209 The
Chinese government has generally pursued a low-key
approach toward the Ukraine crisis, while Russia has
relied mostly on its independent military exercises as
well as those conducted in partnership with the CSTO,
Moscow’s main military alliance, which includes all
SCO members except China. However, Fyodor Lukyanov, an independent Russian foreign affairs specialist influential in Russia’s foreign policy community,
acknowledged that any major Russian-Chinese military exercise would appear as a signal to the West that
China and Russia are developing closer political and
military ties.210
That Naval Interaction 2014 coincided with a period when both countries had tense relations with the
West naturally led to speculation that the drills were
intended to send a message to Western countries, especially the United States, that Beijing and Moscow
had other security options than siding with the Western powers. However, while the 2014 Sino-Russian
maritime exercise might seem a joint reaction to the
countries’ mutual troubles with the West, its timing is
likely coincidental. Since 2012, China and Russia have
held annual naval exercises, with the Chinese defense ministry reporting in 2013 that they were “to be
normalized and institutionalized.”211 Given this, and
the fact that the 2012 exercise occurred in late April
and the 2013 drill in early July, a Sino-Russian naval
exercise was likely to occur sometime in spring or
summer 2014.
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The naval exercises show that China and Russia
are willing and able to cooperate to advance their
joint interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Chen said
that, through the joint naval drills, China and Russia
“demonstrate their confidence to maintain peace and
stability in the region and world.”212 These exercises
have occurred amidst growing tensions in the western Pacific over territorial disputes. China has overlapping maritime claims with several of its neighbors,
with the disputes centered on islands located within
overlapping exclusive economic zones, including with
Japan over islands in the East China Sea. Meanwhile,
China’s and Russia’s territorial disputes with Japan
have become newly acute in recent years. Rear Admiral Leonid Sukhanov, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff
of the Russian Navy and the commander of the Russian contingent to the 2012 maritime maneuvers, said
that the “[p]articipating naval forces will train in the
prevention of armed conflicts in exclusive economic
zones,”213 implying a desire to affirm these disputed
territorial claims. Naval Interaction 2012 took place at
the same time as a large U.S.-Philippines amphibious
drill and followed a series of U.S.-South Korean military exercises that some Chinese and Russian commentators had denounced as exacerbating tensions
on the Korean Peninsula. PRC officials have been
especially incensed that some of these exercises have
occurred in the Yellow Sea, near China’s industrial
heartland and along routes where imports reach key
Chinese coastal cities.214 Yana Leksyutina, associate
professor of international relations at St. Petersburg
State University, said that the China-Russia naval exercise served as a warning to Washington to respect
both countries’ interests and that “the joint drill is a
response to recently intensified military drills in the
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Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea by
the U.S. and its allies.”215
Chinese and Russian analysts also attribute the
exercises to a general Sino-Russian desire to counter
the U.S. rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.
Russian sources cited retired PLA generals as describing Naval Interaction 2012 as a response to the Pentagon’s increased activities in the Asia-Pacific region.216
Igor Korotchenko, chief editor of the National Defense
magazine, added that while “China is not Russia’s
military ally . . . as strategic partners, we want peace
and stability on our borders.”217 Rear Admiral Duan
Zhangxian, PLA Navy deputy chief of staff and the
executive director of the Chinese navy for the drill,
warned that, “The Chinese navy strives for peace.
However, if anyone infringes on the country’s peace,
we will not be afraid to fight for it.”218 Chinese sources
listed a desire to counter U.S. influence in Asia as one
of Russia’s goals in Naval Interaction 2013. A Russianlanguage web site controlled by the Chinese government described Naval Interaction 2013 as “‘an attempt
to resist the ongoing U.S.-Japan alliance’.”219 Perhaps
the clearest sign of China’s anti-Japan intent was
how, following the end of Naval Interaction 2013, five
PLAN vessels conducted their first known passage of
the Soya Strait located between Hokkaido in northern
Japan and Russia’s Sakhalin Island. Xinhua, China’s
official news agency, described the drills as providing China and Russia with “the experience to compete
against the United States Navy and Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force in a real combat environment.”220
Although the specific timing of the exercises seem unrelated to any specific Japanese or U.S. statement of
action, a general Chinese desire to show displeasure
and capabilities in response to the heightened tensions
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with Japan, supported by the United States, is probable. PRC analysts have been complaining throughout
the Barack Obama administration that the Asia Pivot
has been encouraging Japan, the Philippines, and other Asian countries to challenge more assertively Beijing’s territorial claims. The military exercises would
underline China’s assertion of sovereignty and serve
as a warning and deter the United States.221
China also tried to use the exercise to legitimize
the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that Beijing declared in November 2013 but which Japan, the
United States, and other countries have been contesting. Naval Interaction 2014 included air identification
drills. Although they are routine in naval exercises to
ensure that civilian planes are not targeted, Li Jie, an
expert at the PLA’s Naval Military Studies Research
Institute, explicitly claimed that Moscow’s participation in the air identification drills “showed [that it]
supported China’s move to set up the zone.”222 Although no Russian official or expert confirmed this interpretation, the PRC government naturally wants the
world to think this is the case. In addition to attempts
to make it appear as if Russia supported its ADIZ,
China also used the joint exercises as an opportunity
to implement the zone. Before then, China had done
little to actually interfere with U.S. or Japanese violations of the ADIZ that it had declared in November
2013. However, on May 24, at the height of Naval Interaction 2014, two Chinese fighters flew threateningly close to Japanese planes that, according to Beijing,
had violated the ADIZ by coming so close to watch
the China-Russia war games.223 The PRC explanation
for the buzzing is odd. An ADIZ would only require
the planes to identify themselves to China, not avoid
flying in international waters, where the drills were
then occurring.
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In addition, Russia’s participation reflects Moscow’s recent efforts to raise its global naval profile.
Russian fleets are increasing their presence on the high
seas and, after years of falling budgets, finally acquiring newly built warships. More recently, the Russian
media used the Peace Mission 2014 exercise to highlight that, despite Moscow’s alienation from the West
and the many sanctions imposed on Russia due to the
Ukraine conflict, Moscow still had important foreign
partners. Nevertheless, the increased size of the latest exercise may not be related to the most recent international tensions since Russia’s contribution was
comparable in size and status to what Moscow sent to
earlier SCO exercises.224 Some analysts do depict Russia as trying to enhance the SCO to counter NATO and
advance a more multipolar world.225 But it was China,
not Russia, that greatly increased its contribution to
the latest drill. The growth of terrorist attacks in China
during the preceding year and the exercise’s location
in China might explain the PLA increase.
CONCLUSIONS
The joint China-Russia military exercises provide
several benefits to both countries that contribute to
their security partnership. The drills help the Chinese
and Russian armed forces to improve their tactical and
operational capabilities, thereby enhancing their ability to pursue unilateral and joint operations. The PLA,
which has not fought a major war in decades, particularly strives to learn lessons from other militaries.
At times, the Russian government has used the drills
as a way of showcasing military technologies that it
wanted to sell to China. The joint shows of force also
aim to deter and, if necessary, defeat potential threats,
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such as Islamist terrorists trying to undermine Central
Asian states, while at the same time reassuring SCO
member states that China and Russia can protect them
from such threats. Furthermore, the recurring exercises and other joint China-Russia military activities
have a mutual reassurance function, as they inform
Beijing and Moscow about the other’s military potential and thus build mutual confidence about their
friendly intentions toward one another. Finally, the
joint exercises attempt to communicate the message to
third parties, especially the United States, that China
and Russia have a genuine security partnership and
that it extends to cover Central Asia, a region of high
priority concern for Moscow and Beijing, and possibly
other areas, such as northeast Asia.
The China-Russia defense partnership looks likely
to continue for at least the next few years. The new
Chinese leadership seems eager to cultivate defense
ties with Russia. During Xi’s March 2013 Moscow visit, when he became the first Chinese president to visit
the Russian Armed Forces Operational Command
Center, Xi said that:
My visit to the Russian Defense Ministry is intended
to confirm that military, political and strategic relations between the two countries will strengthen as will
cooperation between the Armed Forces of China and
Russia.226

At the time, PRC Defense Minister General Chang
Wanquan told his Russian counterpart, General Sergei
Shoigu, that “China is ready to work with Russia to
tap that potential and expand the scope of bilateral defense co-operation, so as to lift it to a new level.”227 At
the beginning of Peace Mission 2014, General Valery
Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the armed
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forces of Russia, said that, “Russia is ready to make
joint efforts with China to lift the relationship to a new
high.”228 After the drills, Liu Zhenli, Commander of
China’s 38th Army, said that further SCO military
cooperation should seek an expanded “exchange of
ideas on tactical thoughts, joint command, and fighting methods of anti-terror operations.”229 NATO’s decision to suspend military cooperation and contacts
with Russia following Moscow’s annexation of the
Crimea is leading Moscow to place more emphasis on
strengthening security cooperation with Beijing.
One should not exaggerate the significance of these
Sino-Russian military exercises. Russia and China do
not have a formal defense alliance, and there is no
pledge or expectation that they would conduct joint
combat operations anytime soon. In principle, SCO
members might come to one another’s defense in case
of an external invasion, but the organization’s charter does not formally authorize collective defense operations. In practice, China would prove reluctant to
make such a defensive commitment since Beijing has
shunned formal military alliances, while the other five
governments belong to the Moscow-led CSTO, whose
explicit function is to provide for the mutual defense
of its members from external attack.
The exercises that the Chinese and Russian armed
forces undertake without foreign participation are
considerably larger than their joint drills with one another. Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, deputy
chief of the PLA general staff, clearly exaggerated last
year when he said that, “After a decade of cooperation,
I am confident that the two militaries are absolutely
able to conduct joint combat under any conditions.”230
Despite their many contributions, these exercises have
not established a solid basis for a sustained major joint
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Russia-Chinese military operation. Even in the SCO
context, Russia and China lack the interoperability
or integrated command, control, and support mechanisms required to conduct an effective combined military campaign. The Chinese and Russian armed forces
do not rehearse integrated military operations to the
same degree as, for example, do the U.S. military drills
with its NATO allies or South Korea and Japan. The
United States and other countries regularly engage
in many comparably large and often more challenging exercises with foreign partners, including China
and Russia. At best, the Chinese and Russian armed
forces could probably conduct a joint counterterrorist
or peacekeeping mission in a nearby country, but only
if the environment was not too challenging—like Kyrgyzstan in 2010, but not Chechnya in 1999 or Afghanistan today. In those more demanding cases, Russia
and China could at best employ a sectoral approach in
which they would conduct parallel but geographically
separate operations in a common military campaign,
such as might occur in a joint effort to suppress a major Islamist insurgency in a Central Asian country.
Regarding their joint naval exercises, the prospects
of the two countries fighting foreign navies together
seems remote. Even in the case of Japan, with which
Russia and China each have bilateral territorial conflicts, neither Moscow nor Beijing have strongly sided
with the other against Tokyo. In particular, the Russian government has been seeking to regularize its
territorial dispute with Japan rather than establish a
common anti-Tokyo front with Beijing. When Chinese
warships sailed off toward Japan following the 2013
Russia-China naval exercise, Russia’s vessels declined
to follow them in what could have been a joint show
of force designed to intimidate Tokyo. In addition,
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while the general number of Chinese and Russian capital warships has been increasing, the size of their annual naval exercises has remained modest. The small
prospect of a joint Chinese-Russian naval operation
combined with their governments’ limited commitment to the joint maritime drills suggests that other
considerations are driving their naval exercise program, such as building trust and sending messages to
third parties.
Thus far, the U.S. defense community has reacted
with appropriate watchful calm to the Chinese-Russian defense engagements. If anything, these exercises present less of a threat to U.S. regional security
interests than the Sino-Russian arms trade relationship, which at times seems as if it could allow Beijing
to contemplate using its Russian-supplied capabilities to pursue military options against Taiwan or in
other Asia-Pacific scenarios. The U.S. military should
continue to monitor the Chinese-Russian defense cooperation as it sustains its own robust exercise and
exchange series with the far larger number of international partners available to the United States. As
we are daily reminded, unlike Beijing or Moscow,
Washington has many genuine military allies.
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